



APPLICATION OF ERIE RULE PERMITS FEDERAL
COURT TO DISREGARD STATE HOLDING
IN FAVOR OF SUBSEQUENT DICTUM
Plaintiff, employed in Mississippi, was injured by the shattering of a
machine part used in his employment. The part was manufactured by
defendant, a Rhode Island corporation, and purchased by plaintiff's em-
ployer. In a negligence action instituted against the manufacturer in the
Federal District Court for Rhode Island, judgment was rendered for de-
fendant on the ground that under Mississippi law lack of privity between
a manufacturer and an injured party bars the latter from recovery for
negligent manufacture. The court of appeals reversed. Admitting that in
1928 the Supreme Court of Mississippi had held that privity between
manufacturer and injured is a necessary element to recovery in a negligence
action,' the court, nonetheless, concluded that the decision had "lost its
persuasive force" as an indication of the present state of the law of Missis-
sippi. Relying on the fact that the requirement of privity has since been
abandoned in most other jurisdictions2 and that in 1954 the Supreme Court
of Mississippi indicated by way of dictum its "awareness of the modem
rule," 3 the court inferred that Mississippi is "prepared to reconsider and
revise the rule it applied" in the 1928 decision. Therefore, it held that
privity of contract between the user and manufacturer is no longer required
in Mississippi to permit recovery for an injury incurred through the use
of a negligently manufactured product. Mason v. American Emery Wheel
Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3110
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 155).
A federal district court, asserting jurisdiction solely by virtue of
diversity of citizenship, is required by the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 4 to
apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits 5 in order that the
1. Ford Motor Co. v. Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 78, 117 So. 362, 363 (1928).
2. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), first
formulated the modem rule. This rule has since been followed almost universally in
American courts. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) ;
SMITH & PROSsER, TORTS 890 (2d ed. 1957) ; Seavey, Mr. Jtstice Cardozo and the Law
of Torts, 39 COLUi. L. Rxv. 20, 24-29, 52 HARV. L. REv. 372, 376-81, 48 Y.tg L.J.
390, 394-99 (1939); See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1934).
3. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 399, 73 So. 2d 249,
254 (1954).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. Since the trial court was sitting in Rhode Island, the Erie doctrine requires
the court to apply the Rhode Island conflict of laws rule. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Under this rule Mississippi law governed the instant
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outcome of litigation will not vary with litigants' choice of either a federal
or a state forum.0 To effectuate this policy, the federal courts have
formulated guides for ascertaining state law. In the absence of a state
holding on point, the federal courts have attempted to reach decisions on the
basis of an estimate of what the highest state court would decide were the
case before that body.7 In such a situation the courts have considered state
dictum,8 remaining free to reject it 1 if other considerations of the kind
which the local bar and inferior state courts would rely upon 10 point to
the likelihood that the highest state court would not follow its own dictum.11
State holdings, however, normally determine state law. If the highest
court of a state has squarely ruled on the issue, the federal courts have
followed that ruling.'2 Between conflicting holdings, the most recent gov-
erns.13 Where the only indication of state law is a holding of an inter-
mediate state court, that holding controls even though the federal court
considers it clearly erroneous. 14 At least one federal court has ruled that
even though subsequent state holdings on analogous issues seem to indicate
a departure from a rule established by a square holding of a state supreme
court, the prior holding must be followed.' 5 The Supreme Court has
case. For a discussion of the problem raised by the fact that Mississippi law is applied
only because of the Rhode Island conflict of laws rule see note 25 infra. See generally
Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts, 3 S, acusn L. Rzv. 47 (1951);
Note, 41 COLUm. L. Rv. 1403 (1941); Note, 68 HAmv. L. RAv. 1212 (1955).
The Erie rule is subject to limitation in cases which involve the operation of a
congressional program. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 797, 799 (1957).
6. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956), quoting
with approval Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). A second reason for the Erie
rule, that for federal courts not to follow state law would be unconstitutional as a
federal invasion of areas reserved to the states by the Constitution, has been considered
only secondarily by the courts as a factor when determining state law. The constitu-
tional basis of Erie is treated at length in Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Su-
preme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diiersity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-204
(1957). For discussion of the policy behind Erie see Clark, State Law in the Fed-
eral Courts, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946) ; Corbin, The Laws of the Several States,
50 Yale L.J. 762 (1941); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
CoLum. L. REv. 489 (1954); Mishkin, supra note 5, at 860; Note, 48 COLum. L. Rv.
575 (1948) ; Note, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 1299 (1947).
7. Mutual Beneficial Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232, 241 (8th Cir.
1952) ; Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. Mutual Beneficial Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Cohen, supra note 7.
9. Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. Curtiss
Aeroplane Co., 50 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Bank of Cal. v. American Fruit
Growers, 41 F. Supp. 967, 975 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
10. West v. American Tel. & Tel Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940).
11. But for two courts that felt bound by dictum see Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 132 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1942); Handley v. City of Hope, 137 F. Supp. 442
(W.D. Ark. 1956).
12. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941).
13. Janeway v. Artusse, 159 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1947). But compare Layne-
Western Co. v. Buchanan County, 85 F.2d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 1936) with Sabine
Lumber Co. v. Broderick, 88 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 711 (1937).
14. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S.' 169 (1940).
15. Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 118 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1941).
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stated by way of dictum, however, that a state holding need not be fol-
lowed when the federal court can say "with some assurance" that the
holding would not be followed in the future, 16 or when there is "persuasive
data" that the highest court of the state would decide ,otherwise.17 The
instant case is the first to squarely hold that dictum contrary to a specific
holding can be relied upon as being indicative of the existing state law.I S
To reach its conclusion that Mississippi was prepared to overrule its
doctrine of privity of contract, only two factors were considerkd by the
instant court.19 In light of the fact that the court, sitting jn-Riode Island,
did not have the familiarity with the trends of Mississippi "fw and practice
as would a court sitting in that state,20 a wider inquiry into the question
might well have been profitable and could have led to a different result.
Ignored by the court were the facts that at the time of its 1928 decision the
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.21 case, upon which the "modem rule" was
based, was then twelve years old; that in 1940 as well as in 1956 the 1928
decision was cited and an opportunity to overrule was ignored; 2 that
Mississippi apparently is slow to overrule holdings and attaches little
importance to dictum; 2 and that the dictum relied upon was referring
only to a narrow application of the rule of privity, not directly covering
the situation in the instant case3
4
16. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (dictum).
17. West v. American Tel. & Tel Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (dictum).
18. What constitutes such "persuasive data" has heretofore been left largely
undefined. But see Bloomfield Village Drainage Dist. v. Keefe, 119 F2d 157 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 649 (1941) (holding ignored due to subsequent change in
the state constitution) ; Wells v. Kansas Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 754, 757-58 (D.N.D.
1942) (state court holding ignored on grounds that the twenty years subsequent to the
decision had brought about material changes in air transportation, rendering it no
longer "unsafe"), aff'd on alternative grounds, 133 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1943).
19. See text at notes 2-3 supra.
20. That the Supreme Court considers this an important element see Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956) (dictum) and cases cited therein.
21. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22. Gordy v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 188 Miss. 313, 331, 193 So. 29, 34 (1940).
23. See Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799, 806, 77 So. 2d 308, 310 (1955) ;
White v. Williams, 159 Miss. 732, 739, 132 So. 573 (1931) ; State v. Tingle, 103 Miss.
672, 678, 60 So. 728, 729 (1913), quoted with approval in Deer Island Fish & Oyster
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 173, 146 So. 116, 119 (1933). But see Saucier v.
Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 189 Miss. 693, 704, 198 So. 625, 629 (1940).
24. The dictum relied upon by the instant court was taken from a case materially
different in its fact situation from the instant case. There the plaintiff was arguing
that an exception to the requirement of privity which permits Mississippi consumers
to recover damages from manufacturers for personal injuries incurred by eating
contaminated food should be extended to permit recovery for property damages in-
curred when poisonous animal food injured a dairy herd. This dictum read, ". . . The
principle seems now to be well established by the decisions of many courts that a
person who has had no direct contractual relations with a manufacturer may never-
theless recover from such manufacturer for damages to property caused by the negli-
gence of the manufacturer in the same manner that such remote vendee or other third
person can recover for personal injuries ... ." But, the dictum continues, "... How-
ever it is not necessary for us to undertake to determine at this time whether or
not the rule of legal liability applied by our own court in the cases involving manu-
facturers of fodd and beverages intended for human consumption should be applied
in cases involving manufacturers of animal foods ... ." E. I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 399-400, 73 So. 2d 249, 254 (1954).
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Apart from the question of whether or not the particular factors
considered here were indicative of a change in Mississippi law, the problem
presented by the instant case is whether in determining state law a federal
court can best effectuate the policy of uniformity of decision required by
the Erie doctrine by considering state holdings as conclusive of state law.2
In those cases in which the state court would decide in accordance with its
dictum, strict following of state holdings would result in a situation in which
a litigant in a state court would have his case decided in accordance with
the later dictum and a litigant in the federal court would have his case,
involving the same issue, decided upon the contrary holding.2 Thus the
result would be determined by the litigant's choice between a state and a
federal court and might well result in forum-shopping. These are precisely
the evils sought to be cured by the Erie rule. But by attempting to deter-
mine state law not on the basis of what the state court has done in the past
but rather on the basi§ of what it would do were the issue presently before
it, the court replaces certainty and ease of administration of the Erie
doctrine with a ineasure of uncertainty. Since, as pointed out by the
concurring opinion of the instant case, it will be extremely diffcult to
ascertain precisely how convincing dicta or other considerations must be in
order to justify a conclusion that they are indicative of state law, the use
of such considerations could lead the federal court to an incorrect deter-
mination as often as it leads it to the correct one.27 Moreover, it involves
the risk of providing a tempting method by which a federal court can
ignore harsh or unpopular state doctrines. The use of considerable re-
straint by the federal courts will, however, greatly minimize these dangers
and avoid a serious erosion of the Erie doctrine. Since the hostility on the
part of the lower federal judges which first greeted the Erie rule has largely
been dissipated, it is likely that there is less need for mechanical rules to
bind the federal trial courts in their application of the Erie rule than was the
case in the years immediately following the Erie decision s Thus the rule
25. State uniformity of result between the federal court and the Rhode Island
court is the desired result. See note 5 supra. The proper inquiry of the instant court
should have been to ascertain what factors the Rhode Island Supreme Court would
have considered, were this case before it, in attempting to find what factors the Miss-
issippi Supreme Court would have considered with regard to overruling its previous
holding. This added complexity was ignored by the instant court which treated the
problem as being one of finding Mississippi law. For the purpose of this comment,
too, this complicating factor is generally ignored. However, the very fact that the
Erie doctrine creates a situation in which to have uniformity of decisions a court
must predict not merely what a second court will do, but what another court will
predict that a third court will do, supports the conclusion reached in text at notes
25-27 and 31 infra that mechanical rules for ascertaining state law will not always
give the desired result, and much reliance must be placed upon the sound discretion
of the federal judge applying the Erie rule.
26. For a case in which slavish following of state holdings by an able judge led
to the wrong result see Vogel v. Northern Assurance Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3rd Cir.
1955). For a case showing that this ruling on Pennsylvania law was erroneous see
Insurance Co. v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 561-62, 119 A.2d 83, 86 (1956).
27. See note 26 supra.
28. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine
in Diversity Cases, 67 YALt LJ. 187, 214 (1957). Indeed, Professor Kurland sees
in recent decisions an incipient trend away from the mechanical rules of ascertaining
state law.
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of the instant case, applied with caution, would seem desirable. The in-
finite combinations of factors present in an individual case make the formula-
tion of precise rules for applying the doctrine of the instant case impossible.
Since the most accurate indications as to whether a state court will reverse
or follow its prior holding are undoubtedly those which come from the
state court itself, rather than those which are external to it, one or more
of these normally should be present before a holding is disregarded. Among
these considerations are dicta and decisions on closely related issues.
Whether these dicta and related holdings are sufficiently persuasive will be a
function of, first, the similarity of the facts and issues involved and the vigor
with which they are expressed and, second, the extent to which they are
supported by such external factors as changes in economic, social, or tech-
nological conditions which render the prior holding obsolete, widespread
reversal of the rule by other jurisdictions, statutory or constitutional revi-
sion, or the tendency of the state court to follow specific authorities 9 As
the Supreme Court has held, however, the mere unsoundness of the prior
holding or the fact that another holding would be desirable may not be con-
sidered.30 In the final analysis the conclusiveness of these factors must
be determined on a case by case basis and rest upon the sound discretion
of the federal judge.3 1
Insurance-
FILING BY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
STATEMENT OF COVERAGE UNDER SAFETY
RESPONSIBILITY LAW BINDS COMPANY TO
LIABILITY TO FULL EXTENT OF THE POLICY
An operator of an automobile repair business, Smith, used the garage
of Lea to repair a vehicle. While returning to his own garage in the vehicle
Smith collided with another car, injuring plaintiffs. Lea, believing that
he might become involved in liability, informed his insurer, defendant
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, of the accident. Aetna conducted
an investigation and concluded that their policy did not cover the accident.
However, an Aetna employee, acting within her authority, erroneously
filed a form "SR-21" under the Wisconsin Safety Responsibility Law with
the commissioner of motor vehicles stating that the Aetna policy covered
the automobile owner and driver in the accident. When suit was begun
by the injured parties, Lea was dismissed from the action, but his insurer,
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); West v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 238 (1940).
31. For three courts that considered at great length the factors which determine
state law see Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1942) ;
Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951); United States v. Curtiss
Aeroplane Co., 50 F. Supp. 477, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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Aetna, was required to go to trial on the theory that an automobile lia-
bility insurance company can be held liable on its policy if, after the com-
pany has investigated the facts, an SR-21 indicating coverage is volun-
tarily and intentionally filed by one authorized to do so. At trial judg-
ments for plaintiffs were entered against Aetna which were appealed on the
ground that its policy did not cover the driver of the car, Smith. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the legal effect of filing
an SR-21, under such circumstances, [for the purpose of complying with
the Safety Responsibility Law] is to conclusively certify that under the
facts then existing, its policy insured both the named owner and the named
operator of the particular vehicle described .... ," 1 and that therefore
Aetna irrevocably and conclusively admitted coverage of Smith to the
extent of the amount indicated in its policy. Laughnan v. Aetna Cas. and
Surety Co., 1 Wis. 2d 113, 83 N.W.2d 747 (1957).
In a large number of motor vehicle accidents injured parties are left
without adequate compensation because the tortfeasor is judgment proof.2.
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, without abandonment of a com-
pensation system based upon fault, over forty jurisdictions have enacted
financial responsibility laws.3 The Safety Responsibility section of the
Wisconsin Vehicle Code is typical of many of these statutes. It provides
that the driving privileges of both the operator and the owner of an auto-
mobile involved in an accident will be suspended unless security can be
posted or the operator or owner has in effect an automobile liability policy
applicable to the accident with a minimum coverage of specified amounts
to guarantee a source of compensation for injuries sustained if liability
is found.4 Under the insurance commissioner's rules issued pursuant
to the statute an insurance company is required to give official notice of such
insurance coverage to the state authorities by filing a form SR-21, which
may not be withdrawn after thirty days have elapsed.5 The instant decision
is the most recent in a series of Wisconsin cases considering what effect the
filing of a form SR-21 has upon the company's liability under its policy.
In an earlier stage of the instant litigation, it was determined that a filing
indicating coverage of the owner and driver of a vehicle involved in an
accident is at least an admission against interest and admissible in evidence
as such.e Subsequently, Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co.7 held that the filing of an SR-21 could become conclusive on the issue
1. Instant case at 131, 83 N.W.2d at 757.
2. See Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legisla-
tion, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 110 (1954).
3.'See Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
CoLuM. L. Rrv. 300, 307 n.24 (1950); Miller, SR-21, Notice or Contract, 24 INS.
COUNSEL J. 130 (April 1957); Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws Designed To Ex-
clude the Financially Irresponsible Driver From the Highway, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
102 n.3 (1954). Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 85.09-.16 (1951), since re-enacted in Wis. LEG.
Szav. §§ 344.01-.51 (West 1957).
4. Wis. LEG. SEtv. § 344.15(1) (West 1957).
5. Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 257, 258, 73 N.W.2d 587, 593 (1955).
6. Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 73 N.W.2d 587 (1955).
7. 275 Wis. 586, 82 N.W.2d 915 (1957).
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of liability under the policy if, after investigating the facts, the insurance
company, acting through a duly authorized agent or employee, hd volun-
tarily filed an SR-21 form admitting coverage with the intent to be bound
thereby. The requisite intent to be bound previously had been refined to
mean that the SR-21 was filed with intent to comply with the statute.8
Under this doctrine the filing of an SR-21 has been held not to preclude
an insurance company from asserting an exclusion clause defense against
the insured,9 but it does prevent the assertion of such a defense against a
third party claimant.10 Finally, the instant case further held that if lia-
bility is established, it is to the full extent of the insurance policy described
in the form, rather than only to the extent of the prescribed statutory
minimum. In other jurisdictions the filing of an SR-21 has not been given
the same binding effect. In Iowa 11 and Maryland,' 2 insurance companies
which filed an SR-21 under similar statutes have not been precluded from
raising a later defense to liability on the ground of fraud in the procurement
of the policy. A Kentucky court 13 declared that filing of an SR-21 by an
insurance company does not change the established law regarding defenses
to liability on the ground of failure of the insured to cooperate with the
insurer.
The relevant section of the Wisconsin statute provides that "Neither
the report required . . . nor the security filed as provided in this section
shall be referred to in any way-, nor bc evidence of the negligence or due
care of either party. . . •This subsection shall not be construed as ex-
cluding a notice of insurance [an SR-21] from being admissible in evidence
where it would otherwise be material and admissible under the rules of
evidence." 14 This section clearly supports the earlier determination that
a filing of coverage is an admission against interest.15 But if this were
the extent of the legal effect of filing, the insurance company would not be
prevented from introducing evidence that the form was filed by mistake,
neutralizing the effect of the admission.' 6  Instead, the Wisconsin court
has deemed filing conclusive, stating that it would be improper for the
jury to consider rebutting evidence except on the narrower issues of whether
the facts were investigated prior to filing; whether the person filing had
8. Prisuda v. General Cas. Co., 272 Wis. 41, 74 N.W.2d 777 (1956).
9. Pulvermacher v. Sharp, 275 Wis. 371, 82 N.W.2d 163 (1957).
10. Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 82 N.W.2d 915 (1957).
11. Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
12. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp 289 (D. Md. 1957).
13. Strode v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Ky. 1952).
14. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 85.09(11) (1951). Substantially the same provision was
enacted in Wis. LUG. SEav. § 344.21 (West 1957).
15. Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 259, 73 N.W.2d 587, 594 (1955).
16. Comment, 40 MAxQ. L. Rxv. 241, 243 (1956). In commenting on Laughnan
v. Griffiths, supra note 15, the student editor observed that ". . . admissions are
merely evidence, which may be weak or strong depending upon the circumstances of
the case, and as such may be rebutted by the party against whom they were used.
. . ." (citing Levandowski v. Studey, 249 Wis. 421, 25 N.W.2d 59 (1946)).
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authority to file the form; and whether the form was filed with intent to
comply with the statute.
17
This development cannot, except by a strained construction, be traced
to the statute. Earlier suggestions that it might be based on notions of
waiver, estoppel, or contract liability had been criticized 18 and were ex-
pressly denied by the Wisconsin court.19 The Wisconsin decisions can
probably best be understood as a frank judicial attempt to extend the pro-
tection afforded by the statute to motor vehicle accident victims. The
statute attempts, by requiring the uninsured motorist who has been involved
in an accident to post security or lose his registration and operating priv-
ileges, to induce motorists to secure liability insurance. But insurance is
not compulsory, and an accident victim has no effective recourse against
the judgment-proof tortfeasor who has not procured insurance. By holding
the company bound by its SR-21, at least some plaintiffs are recompensed
who otherwise might not be.
Although the humanitarian impulse to compensate injured persons by
extension of the contractual liability of insurance companies on their policies
is understandable,20 concomitant effects of the Wisconsin development may
offset the benefit to the individual plaintiffs aided by it. An immediate
result of making the filing of an SR-21 binding as to coverage will be to
encourage insurance companies to make more thorough and thereby more
costly and time-consuming investigations prior to filing. Higher adminis-
trative costs pressure, of course, toward higher premiums. Of greater
moment, when the liability of insurers on each policy is broadened, the
higher risk of loss, though shifted to the insurers in the first instance, is
ultimately passed on to policyholders in the form of higher insurance
premiums. Unless liability insurance is made compulsory, premiums will
result in discouraging the purchase of insurance, especially in the lower
economic groups, which are most likely to be judgment proof. The ad-
vantage to certain plaintiffs of extending coverage must therefore be bal-
anced against the reduced number of motorists who will purchase insurance
17. See note 6 supra.
18. The theory of estoppel is insufficient to create liability on the part of the
insurance company because the injured party did not rely on the filing of the SR-21.
Though the state authorities relied on the filing, in that they did not suspend the
driving privileges of the owner and the driver of the vehicle, because an SR-21 was
filed, this reliance in no way affected the injured party. Since the insurance company
did not intentionally relinquish known rights, it can not be said that the insurance
company waived any rights by the filing of the SR-21. See Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox,
102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952) ; Bjork, The Legal Effect of "Finding" the SR-21,
26 WiscoNsiN BAR BULLmEN 21 (June 1953). Regarding the problem of the filing
of an SR-21 creating a change in the contractual relationship of the insurer and
insured, see Miller, SR-21 Notice or Contract, 24 INs. CouNsEzL J. 130 (April 1957).
19. Prisuda v. General Cas. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N.W.2d 739 (1957).
20. This trend is illustrated in recent years by the substitution of direct insurance
for indemnity policies, addition of extended coverage provisions in liability policies,
enactment of safety and financial responsibility statutes of the Wisconsin type, a com-
pulsory liability insurance statute in Massachusetts, and the Saskatchewan Automobile
Insurance Act which insures against bodily injury in automobile accidents regardless
of fault through the use of a state insurance fund. These developments are fully
described in Grad, supra note 3.
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at higher rates, a development contrary to the statutory design. This
decision is a complex one, involving many social and economic considera-
tions, perhaps better suited for legislative than judicial determination. The
argument may be made that if the legislature is dissatisfied with the judicial
innovation it may alter the result. However, legislative inertia weighs
against such a possibility. It would seem proper, accordingly, that the
courts refrain from engrafting such doctrines on the safety responsibility
laws as Wisconsin courts have.
Workmen's Compensation-
JOINT LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION AWARD HELD
TO BE APPORTIONABLE BY WAGES PAID
BY THE JOINT EMPLOYERS
Claimant was employed as a night watchman by two companies, Regent
Development Corporation and Butterly & Green, to guard their proximate
properties. He received a weekly wage of thirty dollars from Regent and
fifty dollars from Butterly, the greater portion of his duties apparently
having to do with the premises of the latter. While on the Butterly prem-
ises he was injured. The Workmen's Compensation Board, after finding
that the injury arose out of his joint employment, divided liability for
compensation equally between the two employers. The appellate division
affirmed,' over Regent's contention that the award should be apportioned
according to the proportion the wages paid by each bore to the total wages
received. The Court of Appeals, however, one judge dissenting,2 accepted
Regent's position and reversed the determination that the award should
1. Hunt v. Regent Development Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 862, 148 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d
Dep't 1956).
2. Instant case at 135, 143 N.E.2d at 894. The dissenting judge relied on Sargent v.
A. B. Knowlson Co., 224 Mich. 686, 195 N.W. 810 (1923), where a board decision
dividing liability for compensation equally among eleven employers of a night
watchman was affirmed, but the only issues before the court were whether or not
the employee was an independent contractor and whether the employer upon whose
premises he was killed should alone be liable. See note 5 infra. In addition, ten
of the eleven employers had paid the decedent equal wages. A later case in which
the Michigan Supreme Court held that the fact that the amount of compensation is
gauged by the amount of earnings "would necessitate separate awards if the re-
spective employers paid unlike amounts for the services of the employee" casts ad-
ditional doubt upon the authority of Sargent for equal division. Wing v. Clark, 286
Mich. 343, 349, 282 N.W. 170, 173 (1938). (Emphasis added.) See also Garman v.
Cambria Title, Say. & Trust Co., 88 Pa. Super. 525 (1926), wherein the court affirmed
an equal-division award between two employers. The complaining party there, how-
ever, had paid the employee more than one-half of his total wages and the court
stated, "As the deceased received the greater portion of his wages from the appellant,
it is not in a position to complain of an order requiring it to pay fifty per cent of
the amount of compensation to the plaintiff." Id. at 529. (Emphasis added.)
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be equally divided.3 Hunt v. Regent Development Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 133,
143 N.E.2d 892 (1957).
Several employers will be held jointly liable for a worker's injury
under the various Workmen's Compensation Acts in three classes of cases:
(1) joint employment, of which the instant case is representative and
which arises either where there was concerted hiring by more than one
employer 4 (e.g., A and B, owning adjacent warehouses, agree to hire
a single watchman to divide his time guarding both premises 5) or where
the claimant at the time of injury was doing work for two or more em-
ployers who hired him under separate contracts of employment to perform
separate work for each 6 (e.g., a salesman hired by A and B independently of
one another is injured while traveling to an exhibition where, under the
terms of both contracts, he was to display samples); (2) cases where a
present injury is in part attributable to a condition arising out of an earlier
employment 7 (e.g., a worker's hip fracture is found attributable in part
to a fracture of the same hip suffered six months earlier under a differ-
ent employment; and (3) cases involving a general-special employment
relationship.
8
In a number of states explicit statutory provisions in the Workmen's
Compensation Acts govern the distribution of liability where several em-
ployers are held liable for the injury of a worker in their joint employ.
3. Prior New York cases support the instant court's ruling that the amount of
compensation chargeable to joint employers should be related to the portion of the
total wage paid by each. In Stevens v. Hull Grummond & Co., 249 App. Div. 870,
292 N.Y. Supp. 768 (3d Dep't), modified, 274 N.Y. 227, 8 N.E. 2d 498 (1937), the
appellate division affirmed an award requiring the claimant's two joint employers,
who had paid him weekly wages of eighteen dollars and two dollars and fifty cents
respectively, each to pay one half of the compensation for an injury occurring in their
joint service. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered apportionment upon the
basis of the proportion the wages paid by each bore to the claimant's total wage,
citing the earlier case of Jacobi v. Supreme Junior Coat Co., 268 N.Y. 654, 198
N.E. 541 (1935), as controlling. In Jacobi a salesman was injured in an automobile
collision while carrying display samples for two employers. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the board's 60/40 apportionment of liability based upon wages. Cf. Cyrus
v. Modart Constr. Co., 283 App. Div. 757, 128 N.Y.S2d 115 (3d Dep't 1954), where
the appellate division affirmed an equal division of compensation liability between two
joint employers in a case involving an employment relationship similar to that in the
instant case. This decision, however, has little reference to the propriety of an equal
division in the instant case since the employers there each had paid the injured em-
ployee thirty dollars weekly, and the court cited Jacobi and Stevens with approval.
4. See Sargent v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 224 Mich. 686, 195 N.W. 810 (1923);
Cyrus v. Modart Constr. Co., 285 App. Div. 757, 128 N.Y.S.2d 115 (3d Dep't 1954).
5. In some jurisdictions, liability for compensation in cases of joint employment
is placed solely upon the employer on whose property the claimant was injured. See
Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491 (1916); Murphy
Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 206 Wis. 210, 239 N.W. 420 (1931), 16 MARQ. L.
Rzv. 219 (1932). This rule has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., 11 CALI. L. Rv.
213 (1923).
6. See Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac.
820 (1922) ; Jacobi v. Supreme Junior Coat Co., 268 N.Y. 654, 198 N.E. 541 (1935).
7. E.g., Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N.Y. 146, 175 N.E. 654 (1931).
8. See Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp., 295 N.Y. 457, 68 N.E.2d 440 (1946);
Johnston v. International Freighting Corp., 274 App. Div. 728, 87 N.Y.S.2d 297
(3d Dep't 1949).
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Typical of these is the Delaware statute which provides that ": . . such
employers shall contribute to the payment of . . . compensation in pro-
portion to their wage liability to such employee. . . ." 9 In the majority
of states, however, express statutory provisions relative to this issue are
absent, and the solution must be sought from general provisions govern-
ing the determination of compensation benefits. The New York statute is
representative of this group, providing only that ". . the average weeldy
wages of the injured employee at the time of the injury shall be taken
as the basis upon which to compute compensation or death benefits .... " 10
With this type of statute, the compensation board initially, and subsequently
the court, must determine whether the general award provision relates only
to the aggregate amount of compensation to which the employee is entitled,
or whether it also determines that the responsibility of each employer is to
be measured in terms of the wages he paid the claimant at the time of injury.
Closely related is the problem of the degree of discretion, if any, lodged
in the compensation board to vary the award formula. In a number of
cases, including the instant case, the courts have either specifically found
the general provision to apply to both the aggregate amount of compensation
and the division of liability among employers jointly liable, or at least
have reached the same result by dividing liability for compensation among
the employers according to the proportion the wages paid by each bore
to the total wages received." In other cases the courts have impliedly
rejected the applicability of the general provision by dividing the award
equally among the employers without regard to the proportion of the total
wage paid by each.' 2 In still other cases it has merely been determined
that the employers were jointly liable, thus permitting the claimant to
proceed against any one of the employers for the full amount.12 As to the
discretion of the compensation board, in a few states the board, in the
9. D4L. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2354 (1953). See also GA. CoDm ANN. tit. 114, § 419
(1947); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1031 (1951), Hatch v. Kilpatrick, 142 So. 203
(La. App. 1932); TIN. CODS ANN. § 6882 (Williams 1941), Riverside Mill Co. v.
Parsons, 176 Tenn. 381, 141 S.W2d 895 (1940).
10. N.Y. WoRxmEN's ComP. LAw § 14.
11. See Butler v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P2d 703 (1937) (joint
employment); Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 202 Cal.
688, 262 Pac. 309 (1927) (joint employment); Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922) (joint employment); Wing v. Clark
Equipment Co., 286 Mich. 343, 282 N.W. 170 (1938) (general-special employment);
Stevens v. Hull Grumond & Co., 274 N.Y. 227, 8 N.E.2d 498 -(1937) (joint employ-
ment); Jacobi v. Supreme Junior Coat Co., 268 N.Y. 654, 198 N.E. 541 (1935) (joint
employment). See also 11 CALIr. L. Rxv. 213 (1923) ; 51 HARv. L. Rv. 941 (1938).
12. See Sargent v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 224 Mich. 686, 195 N.W. 810 (1923) (joint
employment); Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp., 295 N.Y. 457, 68 N.E.2d 440 (1956)
(general-special employment); Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N.Y. 146,
175 N.E. 654 (1931) (pre-existing condition contributing to a later injury) ; Garman
v. Cambria Title, Say. & Trust Co., 88 Pa. Super. 525 (1926) ; cf. American Steve-
dores Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 408 Ill. 445, 97 N.E2d 329 (1951) (general-special
employment).
13. See Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 123 Cal. App. 443,
11 P.2d 401 (1932) (joint employment); Frederick A. Stresenreuter, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 322 Ill. 187, 152 N.E. 548 (1926) (joint employment); Rice v.
Keystone View Co., 210 Minn. 227, 297 N.W. 841 (1941) (joint employment).
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absence of express statutory authority, has been held to have no power
to make a determination of the proportionate responsibility of employers
held jointly liable.14 Usually, however, much discretion is left to the board
in matters relative to the payment of claims,' 5 and it is generally accepted
that it has power to apportion an award among several employers when,
in its discretion, such action seems appropriate. The relevant provision
of the New York statute governing the discretion of the board provides
that "the board shall have full power and authority to determine all ques-
tions in relation to the payment of claims presented to it for compensation
under the provisions of this chapter. . . . The decision of the board shall
be final as to all questions of fact, and, except as provided in section twenty-
three (which sets out the procedure for appeal to the appellate division,
third department), as to all questions of law. .... ,, 16 Apparently, the
instant court found that this discretion did not extend to the point of
permitting the board to vary the award formula in cases of joint liability
arising from joint employment. It ruled as a matter of law that respon-
sibility for the award should rest on each employer according to his pro-
portion of the worker's total wages.17 Cases from other jurisdictions also
indicate that notwithstanding the absence of explicit statutory provisions
the discretion of the board is not unlimited in matters of apportionment.
It has been held, for example, that in a case involving an injury attributable
in part to a condition resulting from an earier employment the board can
not arbitrarily fix the liability of each employer but must proportion it
according to his respective responsibility.'"
A rule visiting responsibility among employers held jointly liable for
an employee's injury in proportion to the risks to the employee and the
benefit deriving to the employer inherent in each employment would seem
preferable to one which arbitrarily divides liability equally. That this is
the policy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Acts is indicated by
the provisions measuring compensation payments in terms of wages 19 and,
more particularly, by the section in the New York act which provides that
in cases of occupational diseases attributable to several successive employ-
14. See Sechler v. Pastore, 103 Colo. 139, 84 P.2d 61 (1938) (general-special
employment); Johnson v. Mortenson, 110 -Conn. 221, 147 Ati. 705 (1929) (general-
special employment).
15. See, e.g., text at note 16 infra.
16. N.Y. WoaRxmEN's CoMP. LAW § 20.
17. Instant case at 135, 143 N.E.2d at 894. Compare the dissenting opinion in the
instant case at 136, 143 N.E.2d at 895: "Where, as here, no rule of law controls, the
question as to whether to apportion equally or otherwise is one of fact or equity,
dependent on the circumstances of each case."
18. Dunbar Fuel Co. v. Cassidy, 100 N.H. 397, 128 A.2d 904 (1957). See also
Butler v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P.2d 703 (1937), a case where the
board had found neither of two employers liable for an injury which arose during
transit between two jobs. On appeal the court held that this was a proper case for joint
liability and apportioned responsibility for payments according to relative wages.
The court went on to declare that "and since the full day's wage is paid by the two
separate employers, perhaps in varying proportions according to the value of the
work actually done for each, it is but right that the compensation should be propor-
tionate to the wages paid by each." Id. at 525, 73 P.2d at 706.
19. N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § 14.
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ments the liability for the total compensation shall be apportioned among
the respective employers according to the time such employee was em-
ployed in their service.20 It is for this reason that the rule of apportionment
announced in the instant case appears justifiable, for wages would seem to
reflect the benefit-risk elements inherent in employment with sufficient
regularity to justify their use as a standard for determining the relative
responsibility of joint employers.21 By determining that. this rule of ap-
portionment should be applied as a matter of law in all cases of joint employ-
ment the instant court denied the board discretion in this matter. This
would seem proper since to permit the board to hear evidence and decide
whether or not in each particular case wages reasonably reflect the benefit-
risk elements and, if not, apply a different standard to distribute liability
would, in light of the few cases which might justify this inquiry, unduly
interfere with the timely administration of the act. However, were the
principle of the instant case to be extended beyond its 'factual context,
i.e., joint employment, to demand that compensation liability be appor-
tioned according to wages in all cases of joint liability, for example, in
cases of general-special employment, it might be subject to criticism, for
the employee in those cases does not perform separate work for each
employer-rather his performance of a single and inseparable job is bene-
ficial to two separate employers. Thus, even if separate wages were paid
by the two employers, they would not reflect a variance in the risk involved
in two separate jobs, for only one job is performed. Nor would they be a
reliable measure of the respective benefit to the employers-rather they
would normally be an element of the price bargained for between the gen-
eral and special employer. To illustrate, whether A rents B a truck and
lends him a driver with the understanding that 13 pay the driver's salary,
or whether A demands a greater price to cover both the truck rental and
the wages of the driver, which he agrees to pay himself, the respective
20. "The total compensation due shall be recoverable from the employer who
last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease
was due and in which it was contracted. If, however, such disease was contracted
while such employee was in the employment of a prior employer, the employer who
is made liable for the total compensation as provided by this section, may appeal to
the board for an apportionment of such compensation. . . . Such apportionment shall
be proportioned to the time such employee was employed in the service of such
employers ... ." N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § 44.
21. For an interesting early case where the New York industrial commission
ordered an apportionment of compensation based upon proportionate wages, see Sayres
v. Ogdensburg Power & Light Co., 8 N.Y. Dep't R. 393 (1915). A number of firms,
individuals and corporations were compelled by law to repair a dam on a stream, the
water power rights being owned by them jointly. By court decree three referees were
appointed to carry out the work to be done, their salary to be paid by the owners
affected in proportion to the extent of their water rights. It was held that all owners
were jointly liable for compensation by reason of the accidental death of a workman em-
ployed by the referees, and that the amount payable by each employer was propor-
tionate to the amount of his whter right in the stream where the dam was to be built.
The New York cases recognize the board's power to make an equal division of
liability for compensation payments among several employers held jointly liable in
cases of general-special employment relations and cases invoving an injury attributable
in part to an earlier injury in a previous employment. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
But these situations do not involve considerations present in the instant case. See analy-
sis at p. 937.
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benefit deriving to the two employers would appear constant. Moreover,
in many cases of this nature only one employer pays the claimant's wages,
and thus even if it were found that the injury arose in the course of em-
ployment for both employers, the rule as extended would. preclude any
division of liability.
It would seem that since the wages paid by the employers in a general-
special employment relationship do not reflect the benefit-risk elements
inherent in the respective employments, a prima facie equal division of
liability in these cases is appropriate in the absence of extenuating cir-
cumstances. But the board should have authority to deviate from this
general rule under certain circumstances, e.g., where the injury is causally
related to one employer. Thus, if the general employer rents a truck and
driver to the special employer and the driver is injured in an accident
occasioned by the defective condition of the truck, the general employer
should be made to bear the total cost of compensation payments, because,
while one major purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Acts is to pro-
vide the worker relief for all injuries arising out of the industries covered,
it can not be assumed that the framers thereby intended to remove any
elements of deterrence which might tend to avoid industrial accidents.
Similarly, the rule announced in the instant case should not be applied to
cases of joint liability involving an injury attributable in part to a condition
resulting from an earlier employment, for wages paid under a prior em-
ployment would appear to have little, if any, applicability in determining
responsibility for a subsequent injury. Rather, liability should be visited
upon the prior employer to the extent that the earlier injury contributed to
the later injury. If the rule announced is limited to its factual context it
would appear capable of practical administration and consonant with the
underlying philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
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